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DAUBERT AND THE STATES: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMERGING TRENDS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993.1  This 
case attempted to settle the controversy surrounding the qualification of 
scientific evidence in federal courts.2  Prior to the Court’s decision in Daubert, 
many state courts had adopted the “general acceptance” test promulgated by 
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.3  The application of this 
standard became questionable after the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 (hereinafter “Rule 702”)—the Rule governing the admissibility of expert 
testimony—which did not contain any reference to Frye or to the “general 
acceptance” test.4  The debate concerning the continued efficacy of the 
“general acceptance” test—or Frye test, as it is also called—was decisively 
 
 1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. Id. at 585.  This decision was prompted, at least in part, by some enormous verdicts that 
were arguably predicated on shoddy science.  Another catalyst leading to this decision was the 
rise of products liability litigation in the 1960s and 1970s.  David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 
80 DENV. U. L. REV. 345, 351 (2002). 
 3. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.  Before Daubert, the Supreme Court and many other 
jurisdictions applied the formulation set out in  Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 (D.C. Cir. 
1923) when faced with the proffer of novel scientific evidence.  In this citation-free opinion from 
the D.C. Circuit, the court made the following observation: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and 
demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential 
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in 
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or 
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).  Before the Court adopted Daubert, the alternative test to Frye was 
the so-called “relevancy test.”  For a brief discussion of this test see Andrew E. Taslitz, Daubert’s 
Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Not-So-Plain-Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 3, 36–37 (1995). 
 4. The question of whether Rule 702 supplanted Frye was fueled, in part, by the fact that 
the concept of “general acceptance” was not mentioned in the text of the rule or in the advisory 
committee’s notes.  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.  This absence was quite 
remarkable considering the widespread use of the “general acceptance” test. 
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settled in Daubert.  In Daubert, the Court expressly found that Frye was 
superceded by Rule 702.5 
This decision, at least on its face, has had a marked effect on the 
qualification of scientific evidence in federal courts.6  It has also had a 
significant effect on the qualification of scientific evidence in the state courts.  
Though not binding on the states, the test set out in Daubert has been adopted 
by more than twenty states.7  The Court’s rationale in Daubert has not attained 
universal acceptance among the states, which is evidenced by the fact that as 
many as half the states still apply Frye or some other test when determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony.8  Regardless, this issue remains hotly 
contested by litigants in state courts and has produced significant confusion at 
trial, resulting in numerous decisions in state courts of last resort.9 
Daubert and its progeny have left some state courts in an awkward 
position. This situation resulted because many states have adopted the 
provisions set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Because many states 
have adopted a rule similar to, if not identical to, Rule 702, it would seem that 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that Rule would be fairly persuasive.  
However, some states, whose evidence codes or relevant evidentiary statutes 
 
 5. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (noting the “permissive backdrop” of the rules and the 
“inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony” the Court found “general acceptance” to be 
incompatible with Rule 702). 
 6. There is much debate over whether the Court’s ruling in Daubert actually changed the 
way in which expert testimony is qualified.  This doubt as to whether Daubert has actually 
effected any substantive change in this process has led one scholar to refer to Daubert as merely 
“Frye in drag.”  Paul R. Rice, Peer Dialogue: The Quagmire of Scientific Testimony: Crumping 
the Supreme Court’s Style, 68 MO. L. REV. 53, 62 (2003). But see Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath 
of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 230–31 
(2000) (arguing that Frye “ allowed judges to piggy-back their decisions onto someone else’s 
judgment,” while Daubert “increases judges’ gatekeeping duty by requiring them to evaluate 
claims of scientific expertise much as scientists would”). 
 7. See generally Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of 
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001).  Those states that 
have chosen to adopt Daubert or some similar test include Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  Id.  Those that continue to 
apply Frye include Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
and Washington.  Id.  Alabama, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, and New 
Jersey apply the Daubert factors but have not explicitly rejected Frye.  Id.  Georgia, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin have developed their own tests.  Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 
(Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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are almost identical to Rule 702, have rejected the Court’s interpretation of 
Rule 702.10 
The debate over which standard should apply to proffered scientific 
evidence is not merely a matter of statutory interpretation; Daubert and Frye 
reflect two fundamentally different conceptions of science and the ways in 
which science should be used in the courtroom.  Furthermore, the differences 
between these two tests go beyond the mechanics of admissibility; specifically, 
they represent differing views as to the role of judges and their capacity to 
evaluate complex information. 
A few important questions necessarily arise.  The first is whether there is 
any “practical” difference between the application of Daubert and the 
application of Frye.  If there is no practical difference, as some have argued, 
then the choice of which procedure to use in determining the admissibility of 
scientific evidence is of negligible importance.  If, however, the test for 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony is truly outcome-
determinative, then it is critical that courts adopt the test that best assures that 
relevant and reliable information is not excluded from the purview of the trier 
of fact.  In order to assess the relative merits of Daubert and Frye, it is 
important to possess a clear understanding of the ruling in Daubert and two of 
its most well-known progeny.  Additionally, criticism of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daubert, which has been abundant, is also relevant to the states, in 
that it may be helpful in guiding them toward a more consistent and workable 
approach to the qualification of expert testimony.  This Comment will set forth 
a synopsis of the debate surrounding Daubert and Frye, which will provide the 
foundation for an analysis of several different approaches taken by the states. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: An Evolution in Scientific 
Jurisprudence? 
In Daubert, petitioners attempted to introduce expert testimony concerning 
the anti-nausea drug Bendectin, which was marketed by Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals.11  Plaintiffs’ experts were to give testimony, based upon 
animal studies, that tended to show Bendectin caused cancer.12  The district 
court found that the science underlying the proposed testimony did not meet 
 
 10. See infra Parts III.A.1, B.1–2. 
 11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993).  Petitioners Jason 
Daubert and Eric Schuller (both minor children) were born with serious birth defects.  Id. at 582.  
They argued that their birth defects were caused by their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, a drug 
manufactured by defendant Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.  Id. 
 12. Id. at 583. 
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the “general acceptance” test and held the testimony inadmissible.13  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.14  Because the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling evidenced a discrepancy among the circuits, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the issue presented with a 
discussion of Rule 702.15  In holding that a rigid “general acceptance” test, i.e., 
Frye, was superceded by Rule 702, the Court found that a continued adherence 
to Frye “would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and 
their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to “opinion” 
testimony.’”16  Because Frye was no longer the standard to be applied in the 
federal courts, the Supreme Court formulated a new test based on Rule 702.17 
Under Rule 702, the Supreme Court found that a trial judge should play the 
role of gatekeeper with respect to scientific evidence.18  In this role, a trial 
judge must determine that scientific evidence/testimony is both relevant and 
reliable if it is to be admitted into evidence.19  To be admissible under the new 
test, the subject of an expert’s testimony must be scientific knowledge that is 
grounded “in the methods and procedures of science” and must consist of more 
than “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”20  In other words, the 
proffered testimony must be supported by “appropriate validation.”21  Another 
requirement—stated expressly in Rule 702—is that proposed evidence must 
“assist the trier of fact.”22  This consideration is primarily one of relevance, 
such that the proffered evidence must be tied to the facts of the particular case; 
 
 13. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp 570, 573 (S.D. Cal 1989). 
 14. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 15. In the first sentence of the opinion Justice Blackmun stated that the question presented 
was “to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial.”  
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.  It is important to realize that Daubert was a decision which, by its own 
terms, was restricted to the admissibility of scientific testimony.  This point merits consideration 
because of the Court’s subsequent decisions, effectively subjecting all expert testimony to a 
Daubert analysis.  See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text. 
 16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.  In holding that Frye was superceded by Rule 702, the Court 
recognized that “general acceptance” was not an explicit requirement of the rule, that respondent 
failed to present evidence that Rule 702 was intended to incorporate “general acceptance,” and 
that Frye was not mentioned in the drafting history of the rule.  Id. 
 17. For an interesting evaluation of the interpretative method of the Supreme Court with 
particular emphasis on the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert, see Taslitz, supra note 3.  In his 
article, the author argues that the Court “purported to find plain meaning where none exists.”  Id. 
at 35. 
 18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 589–90 (emphasis added).  The Court’s discussion of “scientific knowledge” 
mainly related to the reliability prong of the Court’s decision.  Id. 
 21. Id. at 590. 
 22. Id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).  The second part of the Court’s analysis relates to 
the relevance prong.  Id. 
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it is sometimes stated that the evidence must “fit” the facts of the case.23  In 
order to resolve these two questions—whether an expert is testifying to 
scientific knowledge, and whether that knowledge will assist the trier of fact—
the trial judge should determine, as a preliminary matter, whether the 
methodology and principles animating the offered testimony are scientifically 
valid.24 
Facially, Daubert expands the trial judge’s role at trial by making it the 
judge’s responsibility to determine whether an expert’s methodology and 
principles are scientifically valid.  Under the Frye test, this determination is not 
for the judge.  Additionally, Frye does not require a trial judge to determine 
whether the methodology and principles underlying an expert’s testimony are 
reliable.25  Nevertheless, the Daubert majority explicitly assigned this “new” 
role to trial judges.  In an effort to provide some guidance to the lower courts, 
the Court offered “some general observations.”26  These observations 
amounted to a set of non-exclusive factors that a judge should assess when 
determining whether a theory or methodology is both valid and applicable to 
the facts of a given case.27  A judge should consider whether a theory or 
technique is capable of being or has been tested, whether it has been subjected 
to peer review and publication, its known or potential rate of error when 
applied, and whether it has gained general acceptance.28 
 
 23. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
 24. Id. at 592–93 (expressing confidence that “federal judges possess the capacity to 
undertake this review”).  The issue of capacity is extremely important to the determination of the 
appropriate standard for admissibility.  It is often argued that judges, with no specific scientific 
background, should not be invested with the duty of evaluating contradicting testimony given by 
two or more qualified experts.  The problems attending the dilemma of the “battle of the experts” 
are central to the proper resolution of the qualification/admissibility debate.  Surely, if federal 
judges are qualified and able to “undertake this review,” state court judges should be entrusted 
with this responsibility as well.  An intriguing take on this issue is the approach of the courts in 
Wisconsin where such determinations are to be made by the jury with the aid of cross-
examination and impeachment.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
 25. Under Frye, the judge hears the testimony of an expert who would testify to whether a 
particular mode of reasoning or methodology was “generally accepted.”  To put it simply, the 
judge would defer to the judgment of one who was qualified to make such determinations.  See 
Saks, supra note 6, at 230–31 (2000).  This is one of the most criticized aspects of the holding in 
Daubert.  The relegation of this duty to the trial judge is controversial because many claim that 
the judge is, for all intents and purposes, a layperson.  As such, it is argued that a trial judge is not 
qualified to make this determination.  See id. 
 26. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 27. Id. at 593.  Importantly, the Court noted that “[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry” 
such that one should not presume that the four factors presented by the Court were meant to be “a 
definitive checklist or test.”  Id. at 593.  This language is important because some jurists and 
others have interpreted Daubert as establishing a rigid framework for admissibility.  See Judge 
Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999). 
 28. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.  The Court observed that “[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 
702 is . . . a flexible one” and the “focus . . . must be solely on principles and methodology, not 
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B. Joiner and Kumho Tire: A Step in the Right Direction, or Another Step 
Back? 
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Supreme Court decided that a trial 
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under Daubert should be 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.29  This standard is equally 
applicable without regard to the “outcome determinative” role that decisions 
made pursuant to Daubert sometimes play.30  At first blush, there is nothing 
especially remarkable about Joiner.  However, when properly read, Joiner 
stands for the principle that “the law grants a district court the same broad 
latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to 
its ultimate reliability determination.”31 Allowing a trial court to decide the 
proper method for determining reliability gives that court broad discretion 
when it conducts Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) hearings pursuant to 
Daubert (sometimes referred to as Daubert hearings).32  The broad discretion 
afforded trial judges in these matters is the cause of a fair amount of the 
controversy on this issue.  Presumably, a trial judge could choose to give more 
weight to the general acceptance criterion than to the other factors established 
by the Court, resulting in a system hardly distinguishable from Frye.  
However, by the same token, a trial judge may play a more expansive role after 
Joiner and Daubert and choose to evaluate any number of indicators that she 
deems relevant to the case, resulting in increased activism on the bench. 
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court held that the trial 
court’s “gatekeeping obligation,” as set forth in Daubert, also applied to 
 
on the conclusions that they generate.”  Id. at 594–95.  Though the Court established the Daubert 
factors as part of a flexible inquiry, some courts have applied these factors in a rigid manner.  For 
a critical analysis of Daubert’s misapplication in the 5th Circuit, see Thomas M. Reavley & 
Daniel A. Petalas, Commentary, A Plea for Return to Evidence Rule 702, 77 TEX. L. REV. 493 
(1998) (providing examples of strict applications of Daubert with the resulting effect of the 
exclusion of expert testimony). 
 29. 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).  Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that the 
Federal Rules allow more scientific testimony than would have been allowed under Frye.  Id. at 
142.  This assertion flies in the face of those scholars who suggest that Daubert really did not 
change Frye in any significant way.  See Rice, supra note 6, at 62. 
 30. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143.  It is clear the Court recognized that rulings on the admissibility 
of expert testimony are outcome-determinative.  The more interesting question is whether the 
difference in the procedures for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence under 
Daubert and Frye are outcome-determinative as well. 
 31. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999) (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 
139).  For a succinct criticism of the Court’s holding in Joiner see Saks, supra note 6, at 240–41 
(arguing that the Court “needlessly abandoned Daubert’s useful distinction between methodology 
and conclusions”). 
 32. For an illustrative analysis of what is actually involved in a Daubert hearing, see G. 
Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 963–66 (1996). 
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testimony based on technical and other types of specialized knowledge.33  In 
Kumho, a case which resulted from an auto accident allegedly caused by a 
defective tire, plaintiffs offered an expert in tire failure analysis who was to 
give testimony based on his technical experience with tire blowouts.34  The 
district court examined the expert’s methodology in light of the Daubert 
factors, even though the expert’s testimony was most likely technical rather 
than scientific.35  The district court found the expert’s testimony unreliable 
based upon an application of the factors set forth in Daubert; as such, the 
district court excluded the evidence and granted defendant’s summary 
judgment motion.36  The Supreme Court found that the manner in which the 
district court analyzed the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion.37  
In finding that Daubert’s “basic gatekeeping obligation” applies to all expert 
testimony, the Court was mindful of the fact that the language of Rule 702 
makes no relevant distinction between the various categories of expert 
testimony.38 
The Supreme Court went on to hold that a trial judge “may” consider the 
specific factors set out in Daubert when determining the reliability of non-
scientific expert testimony.39  Cognizant of Daubert’s instruction that the 
inquiry under Rule 702—in keeping with the liberal thrust of the Rules—
should be flexible, the Court refused to determine if this inquiry should apply 
in all cases, instead stressing that such an inquiry would be dependent on the 
facts in a given case.40  The Court was clear in its assertion that some of the 
Daubert factors could be helpful in evaluating the reliability of experience-
based expert testimony.41  The problem with the Court’s assertion of 
helpfulness is that a substantial part of so-called “experienced-based 
 
 33. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141. 
 34. Id. at 142.  Plaintiff’s expert, Dennis Carlson, Jr., concluded that the blowout was the 
result of a defect in manufacture or design of the tire.  The Court was dubious of this conclusion, 
considering that the tire at issue was admittedly old and showed signs of two punctures that were 
inadequately repaired.  See id. at 143. 
 35. Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp 1514, 1521–22 (S.D. Ala. 1996). 
 36. Id. at 1522–23. 
 37. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142. 
 38. Id. at 147 (noting that it is “the Rule’s word ‘knowledge,’ not the words (like ‘scientific’) 
that modify that word, that ‘establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability’”(quoting Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993))).  The Court was concerned that it 
would be difficult for a district court to “administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping 
obligation depended upon a distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other 
specialized’ knowledge.”  Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148. 
 39. Id. at 150. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 151. 
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methodology” is not, by its very nature, subject to the kinds of analysis set 
forth in Daubert.42 
C. The 2000 Amendment to Rule 702 
Rule 702 was amended in 2000 in response to Daubert, Kumho Tire, and 
to a lesser extent Joiner.43  The 2000 amendment mandates that expert 
testimony shall be admitted only “if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case.”44  The advisory committee’s note makes clear that the 
amendment “provides some general standards that the trial court must use to 
assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.”45  Thus, 
the amendments statutorily incorporate Kumho Tire’s application of Daubert to 
 
 42. See generally David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the 
Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 1 (2003).  But see Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Peer Dialogue: The How and What of “Appropriate Validation” Under Daubert: 
Reconsidering the Treatment of Einstein and Freud, 68 MO. L. REV. 43 (2003) (critiquing 
Professor Crump’s treatment of Daubert-Kumho).  In the first instance, Crump is critical of 
Daubert because the majority’s attempt to define science was inappropriate within the confines of 
Daubert and caused a dysfunctional result.  Crump, supra, at 7.  In this same vein, Crump is 
critical of the Court’s decisions in both Daubert and Kuhmo because of the extent to which the 
Court determined issues which were not before it.  Id. at 11.  However, regardless of Crump’s 
argument, the Court makes clear that the trial judge has considerable leeway in determining 
which of the factors, if any, to use in coming to a reliability determination.  Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 
at 152. 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000) advisory committee notes. The amendment became effective 
December 1, 2000.  Id.  It seems rather ironic that Rule 702 was amended to reflect the Court’s 
decisions in Daubert and Kumho Tire because these decisions were interpretations of the pre-
amended rule. 
 44. FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000). 
 45. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes (emphasis added).  The committee’s notes 
also provide other factors that might be relevant—not exclusive or exhaustive—in determining 
whether expert testimony is reliable including: 
(1) Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly 
out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have 
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.” 
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an 
unfounded conclusion. 
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations. 
(4) Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would in his regular professional work,” 
[not including other work as a paid expert]. 
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results 
for the type of opinion the expert would give. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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all forms of expert testimony; however, it is important to note that “[n]o 
attempt has been made to ‘codify’ [the] specific factors.”46 
Some have claimed that the incorporation of Daubert-Kumho into the 
Federal Rules of Evidence effectively crystallizes an already dysfunctional 
rule.  Scholars have argued that the Daubert framework is problematic when 
confined to the analysis of scientific evidence.47  Without regard to Daubert’s 
narrow conception of science, Crump argues that the guidelines set forth in 
Daubert are not appropriate for the consideration of experience-based 
testimony.48  If it is admitted that Daubert does indeed reflect a narrow 
conception of science, the effect of such a formulation would vary greatly with 
the particular stance a judge took as to her role in determining the admissibility 
of expert testimony.  If the Daubert factors are truly meant to be illustrative, 
then a court need not evaluate evidence in light of those factors that do not 
apply to a specific field or methodology.  If, however, a judge interprets 
Daubert in a stricter sense, or if other criteria for determining reliability are not 
available, these fears could be realized. 
D. Daubert and Frye: A Critical Analysis 
The problem with Daubert is that it has been subject to varied 
interpretations.  One scholar observed that the dilemma of Daubert is that it “is 
at the same time both more restrictive of expert evidence and less restrictive of 
expert evidence.”49  Perhaps this confusion can be attributed to the different 
ways that Frye has been applied.  For example, before Daubert, some federal 
judges took an activist stance in regard to the qualification of scientific 
evidence and continued with this approach after the case as well.50  In contrast, 
other judges operating under the “general acceptance” test merely determined 
admissibility based upon the testimony of an expert who established the state 
of a theory or methodology.51  However, some scholars have argued that 
Daubert did little to change the standard for admissibility in federal courts and 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 42. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Fenner, supra note 32, at 953.  The author argues that Daubert is less restrictive in the 
sense that it allows evidence that definitely would not have been allowable under Frye.  Id.  
Specifically Daubert allows evidence based upon a novel methodology or technique—evidence 
that by definition is not generally accepted—if it proves to be both relevant and reliable.  Id.  It is 
more restrictive in that evidence based on a theory or method that is “generally accepted” will 
still be subject to close scrutiny, and upon careful analysis may yet prove to be unreliable 
(characterized as something other than good science).  Id. 
 50. Id. at 955 (noting that somebody had to get the radar detector in the courtroom in the 
first place). 
 51. See Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner, 
Kumho Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. REV. 
87, 104 (2001). 
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only managed to leave the law governing admissibility of expert testimony 
unclear.52 
1. The Frye Test 
Under Frye, a particular scientific technique does not receive judicial 
recognition until it has passed an experimental phase, during which it has been 
subject to scrutiny from the relevant scientific community.53  Once a particular 
technique is no longer characterized as “novel,” an expert can provide 
testimony based on that theory without the Court making an in-depth inquiry 
regarding that theory’s acceptance by the relevant scientific community.54  
Frye is sometimes lauded by commentators because “general acceptance” acts 
as “an independent safeguard for the trustworthiness of scientific testimony.”55  
In relation to the “relevancy test” as espoused by some courts, Frye has been 
praised because its application is much more practical than a balancing test.56  
Furthermore, Frye has been extolled because it affords protection for both 
parties in that it restricts the use of questionable experts presenting junk 
science.57 
Frye is often commended because it is considered a conservative test.  It 
has been praised because it was “deliberately intended to interpose a 
substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new 
scientific principles.”58  In the abstract, this is a desirable proposition because 
completely unsupported science has no place in the courtroom, especially in 
light of the fact that juries often give great weight to expert testimony.59 
Though Frye is lauded for its conservative nature, this same conservatism 
is a major source of its criticism as well.  Frye’s most damning criticism is that 
the strictures of its application result in the exclusion of reliable evidence 
simply because the evidence has failed to gain the elusive “general acceptance” 
 
 52. See Rice, supra note 6, at 61–63.  To others, Daubert really is important.  These scholars 
argue that Daubert has effected a change in the qualification of scientific evidence.  See Fenner, 
supra note 32. 
 53. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, 
a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980) (describing the analysis under Frye 
as an “evolutionary process leading to the admissibility of scientific evidence”). 
 54. Id. at 1205.  However, such a result may also be reached under Daubert, whereby a 
theory has passed the Daubert test in many courts, and as such another court “may be able to take 
judicial notice of the reliability of the general theory and of the particular methodology.”  Fenner, 
supra note 32, at 1013. 
 55. Taslitz, supra note 3, at 36.  This argument, however, is not very persuasive because 
“general acceptance” remains a factor that courts may, and still do, consider. 
 56. Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1997). 
 57. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976). 
 58. Id. at 1245. 
 59. Id. 
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of the scientific community.60  Though a concrete example is lacking, if it were 
shown that a novel scientific methodology or principle was unfalteringly 
reliable, yet still excluded based on “general acceptance,” this would be strong 
evidence militating against the continued use of this test.  In this same vein, 
Frye has been criticized for its paradoxical effect on different fields of 
expertise.  One critic has argued that less rigorous fields necessarily reach a 
level of “general acceptance” before their more rigorous brethren; accordingly, 
the offerings of these less dependable fields will be received more readily than 
the offerings of more dependable fields.61  Put another way, this is a criticism 
of the ambiguity of the term “general acceptance.”  If this criticism is 
appropriate, then it seems problematic that the disciplines that subject their 
members to the most rigorous scrutiny produce admissible methodologies 
much later than those with less scrutiny.  If reliability is indeed the goal to be 
accomplished by subjecting novel scientific techniques to the “general 
acceptance” test, it is illogical that the techniques with lesser assurances of 
reliability are “rewarded” with earlier admissibility.62 
The Frye test is also criticized for its ambiguity.  One such ambiguity is the 
undefined period of testing or review that must occur before a method or 
technique becomes generally accepted.63  Because there is no precise definition 
of “general acceptance,” a technique may produce consistent and reliable 
results, yet still not have become “generally accepted” under a particular 
judge’s definition.  Thus, under this standard, relevant evidence produced as a 
result of a reliable novel scientific technique may be excluded for an indefinite 
amount of time, thereby denying the trier of fact evidence that may help to 
decide a fact at issue.64  Another criticism is that the application of Frye 
requires the trial judge to defer admissibility questions to a “nose counting” of 
scientists rather than allowing the judge or jury to directly confront the issue of 
the reliability of the evidence.65  This “nose count” problem is another 
reflection of the ambiguous nature of Frye, because it again reflects the 
ambiguity that accompanies the determination of whether a methodology is 
generally accepted. 
Another problem with Frye is that courts have had a difficult time in 
defining what exactly constitutes testimony based upon a novel scientific 
technique.66  This difficulty is similar to the difficulty some courts experience 
when determining which community is the relevant community for purposes of 
 
 60. Taslitz, supra note 3, at 36. 
 61. Saks, supra note 6, at 231. 
 62. Characterizing admissibility as a “reward” is probably incorrect because many, if not 
most, scientists work without considering the effects of their methods on the judicial system. 
 63. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 330 (Cal. 1994). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 329. 
 66. Taslitz, supra note 3, at 36. 
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determining “general acceptance.”67  The choice of the relevant community 
can very well be outcome-determinative because a technique that is 
questionable to mainstream practitioners may be the gold standard for a subset 
of practitioners who argue the merits of their methodology.68 
Frye is also criticized for its lack of clarity as to whether the “generally 
accepted” language applies to principles only, or to techniques applying those 
principles as well.69  One court has criticized Frye because its “requirement of 
‘general acceptance’ is tantamount to a requirement that the validity of the test 
be susceptible of such demonstration as to enable the trial court to take judicial 
notice of the fact.”70  This court was skeptical as to whether a responsible test 
for the admissibility of scientific evidence would “require the instant and 
unquestionable demonstration required for the judicial notice of scientific 
facts.”71  Though Frye has many detractors, it still carries significant weight in 
many states, and there is little indication that Daubert is any less problematic 
than Frye. 
2. The Daubert Test 
Daubert is probably most criticized for assigning the trial judge the 
responsibility for determining the reliability of scientific methodologies and 
principles.  This criticism stems from the oft-recited fact that Daubert and 
Kumho arguably “assign[ed] the responsibility for screening” offered expert 
testimony to those who “have no particular expertise for conducting those 
evaluations.”72  This criticism is not reserved to a trial judge’s lack of scientific 
knowledge but also her lack of exposure to other technical knowledge as 
well.73  Daubert is also criticized because its framework can, and oftentimes is, 
applied too rigidly, resulting in the exclusion of otherwise meritorious claims, 
unsupportable without the excluded scientific evidence.74 
Daubert’s criticisms are more sweeping as well.  It is sometimes argued 
that this case failed in its essential purpose of encouraging a more liberal 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See e.g., State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 
(Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 69. Taslitz, supra note 3, at 36. 
 70. State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 979 (La. 1979). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Saks, supra note 6, at 230. 
 73. It is unclear whether the reliability determination is more difficult in regard to expert 
scientific testimony than it is for technical or other experience-based testimony.  However, given 
the flexible nature of the inquiry it would seem that the judge would be able to conduct inquiries 
into such testimony the same way that they do in cases involving scientific evidence.  Further, it 
would seem that all things being equal, a judge’s lack of exposure would render him equally 
capable of judging the reliability of a method or principle derived from a technical or experience-
based perspective. 
 74. See Owen, supra note 2, at 372. 
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approach toward the admissibility of evidence; that it in fact accomplished the 
opposite—effectively restricting the admissibility of evidence further than 
Frye.75  Though it is certainly the case that some courts have applied Daubert 
with more rigidity than was intended, the Supreme Court clearly held that the 
inquiry should be a flexible one.  The source of rigidity in the application of 
the Court’s decision can only be attributed to a finite number of causes.  Either 
the judge has misinterpreted the Court’s opinion, is unable to formulate her 
own gauges for reliability, is not willing to undertake an inquiry outside the 
explicit dictates of the case, or simply that indicators of reliability are 
unavailable concerning certain kinds of information. 
Daubert is also criticized for its ill-founded and narrow conception of 
science.  For example, Professor Crump argues that the Daubert framework for 
reliability fails to give adequate consideration to the relationship between 
“communicational tractability and empirical validity.”76  Essentially, Crump 
argues that a small sacrifice in “empirical validity,” that is, simplifying some 
concept or notion into a model or map, can greatly benefit a jury’s 
understanding of a particular issue, with only a small and irrelevant sacrifice in 
the validity of what is being communicated.77  Fundamentally, Crump argues 
that the Court should have used the standard of “appropriate validation,” as 
espoused by Professor Imwinkelried,78 and never ventured into the dicta of the 
four-factor test.79 
Some have argued that Daubert’s conception of reliability is too 
amorphous and that its definition is not clear.80  As such, they argue the lower 
courts are left without meaningful guidance in the application of the law.81  
One federal judge complained that “[t]he very characterization of scientific 
knowledge as the ultimate question of admissibility” is problematic in that it 
leads judges to undertake “‘independent validation of the expert’s 
methodology,’ pretending to scientific expertise and objectivity.”82  This 
argument concludes with the observation that the current standard leads some 
judges to decide cases in contravention of the Seventh Amendment and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.83  At the heart of these arguments is the belief that 
 
 75. Michael H. Graham, The Daubert Dilemma: At Last a Viable Solution?, 179 F.R.D. 1, 3 
(1998). 
 76. Crump, supra note 42, at 35. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Imwinkelried, supra note 42. 
 79. Crump, supra note 42 (providing a more in-depth analysis of Daubert and its treatment 
of modern science). 
 80. Reavley & Petalas, supra note 28, at 510–11. 
 81. Id. at 510. 
 82. Id. at 511 (footnote omitted). 
 83. Id. at 512 (claiming that the current analysis causes some judges to “undertake to 
determine complex scientific issues by caprice”). 
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lay judges are not qualified to resolve the issues brought before them in 
Daubert cases—or at least those dealing with evidence produced by a novel 
scientific technique. 
III.  DAUBERT AND FRYE—A BATTLE FOR THE STATES 
Most of the states have been confronted with the same problem the 
Supreme Court faced when it decided Daubert.  This problem arises because of 
the apparent contradiction between the statute or code provision governing the 
admissibility of expert testimony and the “general acceptance” standard of 
Frye.  At one time, most of the states had adopted a provision similar to Rule 
702 and yet continued to apply Frye.  Some of these states discontinued their 
adherence to Frye and adopted Daubert.  However, some that chose to 
overrule Frye did not feel compelled to adopt the Supreme Court’s 
formulation. Instead, these states constructed admissibility standards 
independent from both Frye and Daubert. 
A third option emerged as well.  A significant number of states reconciled 
the general acceptance test enunciated in Frye with their respective rules 
governing expert testimony.  The most interesting group of states is composed 
of those that chose to formulate their own standards for admissibility.  
Missouri, Wisconsin, and Delaware are three states that have developed 
alternative tests. 
A. Independent Formulations for Determining Admissibility 
1. Missouri: “Forget Frye.  Forget Daubert.  Read the statute.”84 
Until recently, the applicable standard for the qualification of expert 
testimony in Missouri was unclear.  The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted 
the Frye test for civil suits in Alsbach v. Bader.85  This decision, eight years 
before Daubert, was unremarkable when it came down.  However, the 
continued efficacy of this standard became questionable when Missouri 
adopted a statutory provision similar to Rule 702.86  Surprisingly, or perhaps 
 
 84. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 160 (Mo. 
2003) (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 85. 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). 
 86. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065 (1989).  This statutory provision was adopted in 1989; it 
provides: 
1. In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
2. Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the 
trier of fact. 
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not, Frye remained the standard in Missouri despite the absence of any 
mention of Frye or “general acceptance” in the statute. 
The first arguments in support of a Daubert-like interpretation of section 
490.065 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (Missouri’s statutory provision 
governing the admissibility of expert testimony) came to the Missouri Supreme 
Court in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital.87  However, as what 
eventually became a recurring trend, the Court skirted the issue and held that 
“it would be inappropriate . . . to decide in [Callahan] whether section 
490.065, RSMo Supp.1992, supersedes the Frye doctrine in the same manner 
that Daubert held that Federal Rule 702 changes the requirements for the 
admissibility of expert testimony in federal court.”88  In 1997, the Court 
decided Lasky v. Union Electric Company, and attempted to clarify the issue 
by holding that section 490.065 should govern the admissibility of expert 
evidence.89  Though the Court directed the lower court to apply section 
490.065 on remand, it did not provide any analysis or guidelines for the 
application of the statute.90  If the Court truly intended to settle the debate 
between Daubert and Frye in Lasky, it failed to do so.  Neither Daubert nor 
Frye was mentioned in the Court’s opinion, despite the fact that Frye had been 
the avowed standard in Missouri for at least twelve years.91 
In State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri confirmed that section 490.065 should govern the 
determination of the admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases.92  This 
case involved a disciplinary complaint filed by the State Board of Registration 
for the Healing Arts (“the Board”) against Edward McDonagh, D.O., for his 
use of chelation therapy in the treatment of vascular disease.93  The 
Administrative Hearing Commission (“AHC”) found no cause to discipline Dr. 
McDonagh, and the circuit court affirmed.94  On appeal, the Board claimed that 
 
3. The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing and 
must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reasonably reliable. 
4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference 
and give the reasons therefor without the use of hypothetical questions, unless the court 
believes the use of a hypothetical question will make the expert’s opinion more 
understandable or of greater assistance to the jury due to the particular facts of the case. 
Id. 
 87. 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
 88. Id. at 860. 
 89. 936 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. 123 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) [hereinafter McDonagh]. 
 93. Id. at 148–49. 
 94. Id. at 149. 
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the AHC erroneously failed to apply Frye in evaluating the testimony of Dr. 
McDonagh’s experts.95  The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and 
remanded with a direction to apply section 490.065 on reconsideration.96 
According to the Court in McDonagh, Lasky should have been interpreted 
as a directive mandating that section 490.065 superseded Frye, and the statute, 
not Frye, was to control.97  To resolve any ambiguities, the Court held that any 
cases applying Frye or any other standard (i.e. Daubert) were no longer to be 
followed.98  Under the new standard promulgated by the Court in McDonagh, 
for expert testimony to be admissible, the facts or data relied on by an expert 
“must be those reasonably relied on by experts in the relevant field.”99  
Cognizant of the fact that few cases had interpreted section 490.065, the Court 
held that those cases (including Daubert) which interpret Rule 702 “provide 
relevant and useful guidance in interpreting and applying section 490.065.”100  
However, the Court held that when the provisions of section 490.065 differ 
with those in Rule 702, the Missouri statute governs.101 
As the Court pointed out, a key difference between section 490.065 and 
Rule 702 is section (3) of 490.065.  This section provides that facts and data 
that serve as the basis of an expert’s opinion “must be of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject.”102  As such, there is an explicit reliability requirement in the statute 
that must be evaluated by the court.  As the Court explained, this is the key 
difference between section 490.065 and Rule 702 as interpreted in Daubert 
because “in the federal courts an expert need not necessarily identify the 
relevant scientific community, or field, in which the data and facts are 
accepted.”103  This difference was important to the Court’s analysis because 
this determination was dispositive in the case.104 
The difference between section 490.065 and Rules 702 and 703 is 
significant.  In McDonagh, the Court explained that the provision in 703, 
which is identical to section 490.065(3), is only relevant as an independent 
requirement of admissibility and not as a prerequisite to the admissibility of 
expert evidence.105  In contrast, an expert in Missouri must identify the 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 153. 
 98. Id. at 149. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 155 (citation omitted). 
 101. Id. 
 102. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 156 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065(3) (1989)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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community of experts that have accepted the facts at issue.106  This difference 
may not seem extremely important, but the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of this language is different from the standard interpretation of 
Rule 703.  The provision in Rule 703 that provides, “of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject” is meant to overcome a hearsay objection if an expert 
testifies to facts that are not in the record.107  In Rule 703, this provision is not 
seen as a factor going to the reliability of an expert’s opinion; however, in 
Missouri, this is the interpretation given by the Court.  In McDonagh, the 
Court explained that section 490.063(3) “expressly requires a showing that the 
facts and data are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject of the expert’s testimony.”108 
In determining the relevant community, Dr. McDonagh argued that it 
should be those practitioners who utilize chelation therapy.109  However, as the 
Court points out, this would be a foolhardy inquiry because this community 
would consist only of those who chose to practice this therapy in the first 
place; thus, they would necessarily testify that this methodology is of a type 
reasonably relied on by experts in the field (i.e., them).110  Instead, the Court 
determined that the relevant community should be those who treat patients 
with vascular disease, so the facts upon which Dr. McDonagh’s experts relied 
“must be those perceived by them at trial or must be of a type reasonably relied 
on by doctors treating vascular disease.”111  The Court was adamant that it was 
not simply adopting Frye under another name, and it asserted that, as under 
Daubert, general acceptance is only one factor to be considered in determining 
the reliability of a method or technique.112 
The practical effect of the Court’s ruling is unclear.  Although the Court 
professes that Frye is not the standard in Missouri, it is difficult to see the 
distinction.  At first, it seems that the Court created a test that combines 
Daubert and Frye.  However, when analyzed more carefully, any interpretation 
by the Supreme Court of the United States falls out of the equation.  Under the 
Missouri formulation, the testimony of an expert must be based on facts and 
data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.  This decision, in 
effect, makes general acceptance by the relevant scientific community a 
threshold consideration for the admissibility of expert testimony.  If an expert’s 
methods are not accepted by the relevant community, then no further inquiry is 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. See generally 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1051 (2004); see also 31A AM. JUR. 2D 
Expert and Opinion Evidence § 171 (2004). 
 108. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 156. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 157. 
 112. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 156. 
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necessary, and the testimony is inadmissible.  However, if the facts and data 
are generally accepted, the testimony must still be found to be both relevant 
and reliable under the Daubert analysis.  This formulation is inherently 
contradictory.  If general acceptance is now a threshold requirement for expert 
testimony, analyzing the testimony any further would be superfluous.113  
Although it seems that Daubert’s factors would provide additional aid in a 
court’s reliability determination, it is the rare case indeed where an expert’s 
theory is generally accepted yet unreliable. 
2. Virginia 
Virginia has adopted its own standard for determining the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.114  This test was set out in Spencer v. Commonwealth.  In 
Spencer, the court was faced with the proffer of DNA evidence derived from a 
process known as PCR DNA amplification.115  Defendant/Appellant claimed 
that this process was neither reliable nor generally accepted by the scientific 
community.116  The Commonwealth called two expert witnesses who testified 
that PCR DNA amplification was scientifically reliable.117  In finding this 
evidence admissible, the court provided a detailed analysis of the test that 
Virginia courts have adopted.118 
In Virginia, when expert scientific testimony is proffered, it is the 
responsibility of the court to make a threshold finding of fact regarding the 
reliability of the underlying method or technique.119  This finding must be 
made unless the technique is “so familiar and accepted as to require no 
foundation” to establish the reliability of the technique, e.g., fingerprint 
analysis; or “unless it is so unreliable that the considerations requiring its 
exclusion have ripened into rules of law,” e.g., lie detector tests; or unless the 
admission of the evidence is governed by statute, e.g., blood alcohol test 
results.120  The court stressed that the determination regarding the reliability of 
an offered scientific method is discretionary.121  Within its discretion, a court 
usually relies on the testimony of an expert, and its decision on reliability, 
though contested, will not be overturned if its finding is supported by credible 
 
 113. See id. at 156–57. 
 114. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990). 
 115. Id. at 620.  In this case, the more recognized process of DNA printing was not available 
to the state because the seminal fluid samples were too degraded for that technique.  Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  The Court noted that PCR DNA amplification had been widely used in molecular 
biology since 1985 but that its application in forensic science was relatively new.  Id. 
 118. Id. passim. 
 119. Spencer, 393 S.E.2d at 621. 
 120. Id. (citations omitted). 
 121. Id. 
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evidence.122  Further, when the reliability of a technique or method is disputed, 
the court may submit the evidence to a jury—along with instructions to the 
jury to take into account the disputed reliability when determining the weight 
and credibility of the witness—provided “there is a sufficient foundation to 
warrant [its] admission.”123 
Under Virginia’s system, responsibility falls on the court to filter out 
evidence that is inherently unreliable.  Other than those methodologies that are 
plainly faulty or so established as to be beyond reproach, Virginia courts have 
decided that it should be the jury’s job to resolve contested issues of reliability.  
This delegation of responsibility to the jury is quite different from what is done 
in the federal courts and in most other states.  As did those states that have 
adopted Daubert, the Spencer court recognized the importance of leaving 
admissibility questions to the discretion of the trial court.124  In light of the 
wide discretion afforded trial courts in their determinations of reliability, and 
the fact that the PCR DNA amplification was not a method so inherently 
unreliable as requiring that it be shielded from the jury, the court did not 
disturb the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence.125 
3. Wisconsin 
Wisconsin, like Missouri and Virginia, has chosen not to follow Frye or 
Daubert.  Wisconsin rejected Frye earlier than most states, which may be a 
contributing factor to its decision to adopt neither Frye nor Daubert.  In 
Watson v. State, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was critical of Frye and 
adopted a passage from McCormick finding general acceptance “a proper 
condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the 
admissibility of scientific evidence.”126  The court held that the proper 
challenge to such evidence should be through cross-examination or 
impeachment evidence.127  So long as an expert is qualified, her testimony can 
be submitted to the jury, and questions relating to the reliability of the 
proposed expert’s methodology are left for the jury to decide on the grounds of 
weight and credibility.128 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin clarified its decision in Watson with its 
explanation of the admissibility requirements of scientific evidence in State v. 
Walstad.129  In Walstad, the court explicitly held that Frye was rejected in 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Spencer, 393 S.E.2d at 621. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Watson v. State, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Wis. 1974) (quoting MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 351 N.W.2d 469 (Wis. 1984). 
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Wisconsin. The court’s repetition of this proposition of law was necessary 
because the lower courts in the state continued to apply Frye.130  At the outset, 
the court held that Frye was incompatible with the statutes governing 
admissibility in Wisconsin, and “is alien to the Wisconsin law of evidence.”131  
Reaffirming its holding in Watson, the court held that evidence given by a 
qualified expert is “admissible irrespective of the underlying theory on which 
the testimony was based.”132  Thus in Wisconsin, the most critical 
determination relating to admissibility is the qualification of the expert; 
consequently, if the testimony is relevant, it can only be attacked through 
impeachment and credibility.133  Essentially, the test for the admissibility of 
expert testimony in Wisconsin consists of three parts.  First, the evidence must 
be relevant; second, the witness must be qualified as an expert; and third, the 
evidence must assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue.134 
Clearly, Wisconsin puts more faith in the jury than any other state.  In 
federal courts, the trial judge is the gatekeeper; it is her responsibility to 
evaluate the evidence and determine if it is reliable.  In those states that 
continue to follow Frye, the judge, in effect, defers to an expert in the field 
who testifies as to whether the theory is generally accepted by the relevant 
community of scientists.  In Wisconsin, so long as an expert is qualified, it is 
the responsibility of the jurors to evaluate the testimony given by that expert.  
Then, after hearing the cross-examination of the expert, the jurors should 
compare the testimony on direct examination with that elicited on cross-
examination (and the testimony of other witnesses) and determine the 
reliability of a particular methodology through their determination of the 
weight and credibility to be given the witness. 
4. Independent Tests for Determining Admissibility: Misplaced 
Confidence or a Step in the Right Direction? 
It is too soon to determine the effect of the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
opinion in McDonagh.  However, to the extent that that court relies on the 
plain meaning of its evidentiary statute to guide admissibility determinations 
on scientific evidence, litigants are left with painfully little to go on.  Instead of 
providing some coherent mechanism to guide litigants in Missouri courts, the 
Supreme Court has left only a confused amalgam that begs for revision. 
Virginia and Wisconsin have developed tests that are remarkably 
dissimilar to both Frye and Daubert.  The tests in place in both of these States 
 
 130. See id. at 485; see, e.g., State v. Bohner, 246 N.W. 314 (Wis. 1933); State v. 
Stanislawski, 216 N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 1974); State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 1981); State v. 
Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. 1983). 
 131. Walstad, 351 N.W.2d at 486. 
 132. Id. at 487. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 486. 
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reflect either an unparalleled respect for the abilities of juries or a pragmatic 
solution to a difficult problem.  Virginia allows an expert to testify before the 
jury even if the reliability of a method or principle upon which he bases his 
testimony is disputed, so long as there is a sufficient foundation to warrant 
admission.  In effect, the test in Virginia allows for evidence based on 
extremely reliable and extremely unreliable science to be handled in a 
summary fashion.  However, at the margins, Virginia courts allow evidence to 
reach the jury, even if it is not based on “generally accepted” methodologies or 
lacks some hallmarks of reliability.  This approach gives judges the discretion 
to allow an expert to testify based upon disputed science, where in other 
jurisdictions the judge may have been forced to, in effect, pick a side and 
exclude evidence that could be potentially reliable.  In Virginia, this potential 
is assessed by the jury, who, after having heard the testimony and cross-
examination, make the determination.  Similarly, Wisconsin courts have put 
the ultimate reliability determination in the hands of the jury by allowing an 
expert to testify so long as she has been qualified by the court.  Again, like 
Virginia, the reliability of testimony based on arguable science is a matter for 
the jury to decide after observing cross-examination. 
In those states that continue to follow Frye, it is argued that a conservative 
test is absolutely necessary when dealing with scientific evidence.  These 
courts adopt and embrace the notion that judges, and a fortiori jurors, do not 
have the education or experience to decide disputes concerning the reliability 
of scientific principles and methodology.  Under Daubert, it is clear that as a 
gatekeeper, it is the responsibility of the judge, not the jury, to determine 
whether scientific evidence is reliable and relevant.  By contrast, courts in 
Wisconsin and Virginia are confident that an adequate resolution to disputed 
reliability can be gained through a jury’s evaluation of the weight and 
credibility of expert witnesses.  It is unclear whether the Virginia and 
Wisconsin tests rest on the assumption that lay jurors possess the faculties to 
come to meaningful determinations on scientific reliability.  It may be that the 
courts in these states have determined it is unwise to restrict the jury from 
hearing testimony, the reliability of which the judge himself cannot determine, 
where they can hear the testimony and make the determination themselves. 
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B. States that Continue to Follow Frye 
1. California 
California continues to adhere to a modified version of the Frye test.135  
California’s current test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence is the 
Kelly/Frye test.136  In Kelly, the Court set forth three general considerations 
that should guide the admissibility determination regarding evidence based on 
a novel scientific technique.  First, “the reliability of the method must be 
established, usually by expert testimony,” second, “the witness furnishing such 
testimony must be properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion on the 
subject,” and third, “the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that 
correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case.”137  In 
conjunction with the aforementioned general principles of admissibility, the 
Court adopted the “general acceptance” test as set out in Frye.138  The Court’s 
primary justification for the adoption of Frye was the fact that Frye is a 
conservative test.139  The Court wanted to ensure that evidence based on new 
scientific techniques was subject to a strict test because of the possibility that 
jurors could be easily swayed by the “misleading aura of certainty which often 
envelops a new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental 
nature.”140 
As was the case in most other states, Daubert brought into question the 
continued merit of using a test based on Frye.141  One court in California, 
recognizing that “the Frye half of the Kelly/Frye rule may . . . no longer exist,” 
persisted in applying the rule (and using the name) because Kelly was a 
 
 135. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, (Cal. 1976) (noting that California Courts have 
expressly adopted the Frye test) overruled on other grounds by People v. Wilkinson, 94 P.3d 551 
(Cal. 2004).  The Court in Kelly lauded Frye because it “assures that those most qualified to 
assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice.” Kelly, 549 
P.2d at 1244 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743–44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).  Further 
praise of this standard was given because it applies equally to both prosecution and defense and it 
is likely to produce consistent and uniform decisions.  Id. 
 136. See People v. Reilly, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
 137. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244. 
 138. Id.  The Court recognized the conservative nature of the Frye test but felt “judicial 
caution” was appropriate when dealing with evidence based on new scientific techniques.  Id.  
The Court firmly rejected the argument that the admission of this evidence should be left to the 
discretion of the trial court, noting that this rejection was in accordance with the rationale that 
other states had adopted.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 1245. 
 140. Id.  (quoting Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 390 (Cal. 1966)). The Court’s 
dedication to a conservative approach may also be accounted for by an increased need for caution 
in criminal cases.  See id. 
 141. See People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1123 n.9 (Cal. 1993). 
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decision that construed the California Evidence Code.142  One year after the 
Supreme Court of the United States decided Daubert, the Supreme Court of 
California held in People v. Leahy that “Daubert affords no compelling reason 
for abandoning Kelly.”143  In Leahy, the Court acknowledged that sections 720 
and 801 of the California Evidence Code are the functional equivalent of Rule 
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.144  As in Rule 702, the statutory 
language in the California Evidence Code does not contain any specific 
reference to Frye’s “general acceptance” standard, nor does the drafting history 
of the California Evidence Code establish any intent to incorporate such a 
standard.145  In Leahy, the court found the fact that Kelly was decided eleven 
years after the adoption of the California Evidence Code in 1965 persuasive.146  
Furthermore, because Kelly was rendered after the Code was adopted, the court 
found the rationale in Daubert unpersuasive.147  After conducting a cost-
benefit analysis of Kelly/Frye’s continued place in California law, the court 
was convinced that the standard was appropriate.148 
Implicit in the logic supporting the continued efficacy of the Kelly/Frye 
test is the notion that lay judges are not qualified to gauge whether a particular 
scientific technique is accorded general acceptance.149  This view is in stark 
contrast to that expressed by the majority in Daubert, which argued that federal 
 
 142. In re Aontae D., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 179 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 143. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 324 (Cal. 1994). 
 144. Id. at 327.  As quoted in the Court’s opinion: 
Section 720, subdivision (a) provides that “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if 
he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify 
him as an expert on the subject to which the his testimony relates. . . .”  Subdivision (b) of 
that section provides that “A witness’ special knowledge . . . may be shown by any 
otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony.” 
  Section 801 permits an expert to state an opinion that is “(a) Related to a subject that 
is sufficiently beyond  common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the 
trier of fact; and (b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge . . .) perceived by 
or personally known to the witness . . ., whether or not admissible, that is of a type that 
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to 
which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter 
as a basis for his opinion.” 
Id. 
 145. Though there is no statutory language that directly incorporates a “general acceptance” 
standard, the court in Leahy notes that the language is “of a type that reasonably may be relied 
upon by an expert,” and may be broad enough to incorporate such a standard.  Id. at 327–28. 
 146. Id. at 328 (noting that the court in Kelly was presumably aware of Frye’s absence from 
the Code and its history, and the fact that the “general acceptance” standard could well have been 
interpreted as contradictory with the liberal thrust of the California Evidence Code). 
 147. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 331.  The court also found the fact that although many amendments 
had been made to the expert testimony provisions of the California Evidence Code, the lack of 
any change to 720 and 801 is evidence of legislated adoption of the standard.  Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 325. 
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judges possess the capability to ascertain the validity of a particular scientific 
method or technique.150  One is left to wonder whether this contradiction 
results from a supposed disparity between the respective abilities of members 
of the state and federal judiciaries, or whether it is merely the result of 
differing views on the judge’s role in these proceedings. 
In California, the Kelly/Frye test is limited in scope.  This test only applies 
to the admission of scientific evidence; however, it is not limited to 
“‘machines’ or techniques that involve the manipulation of physical 
evidence.”151  One justification for drawing a distinction between evidence 
derived from a novel scientific technique and that derived from the experience, 
technical expertise, or education of a witness is a product of the relative weight 
a jury will give to a  piece of evidence.  It is argued that jurors tend to ascribe 
too much credence to evidence produced by a machine;152 whereas, a juror is 
more inclined to be skeptical of the opinion of one qualified as an expert, 
because though the opinion is from an expert it is from a fallible human just 
the same.153 
2. Florida 
In Florida, questions of admissibility are governed by the Florida Evidence 
Code.154  In spite of, or perhaps, because of this fact, Florida still adheres to a 
version of the Frye test.  In Hadden v. State, the Florida Supreme Court 
reiterated its commitment to Frye by holding that novel scientific evidence is 
not admissible unless it meets the Frye test.155  The Court then addressed the 
effect that the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code had on the continued 
efficacy of the Frye test.156  The Hadden Court argued, inter alia, that “a 
courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such it is not the place to conduct 
scientific experiments.  If the scientific community considers a procedure or 
 
 150. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 151. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 717 (Cal. 1989).  The court noted that “[t]estimony based 
on a new scientific process ‘operating on purely psychological evidence’ would be subject to the 
Kelly/Frye test.  Id. 
 152. See Wilson v. Phillips, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (West 2004) (treating expert testimony substantially 
similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 702).  Neither this provision, nor the notes accompanying it, 
make any reference to Frye or “general acceptance.”  Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 
1997). 
 155. Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 581. 
 156. Id. at 577.  The court was mindful of the arguments made by litigators and the holdings 
of some district courts concerning the absence of mention to Frye in the newly adopted Code.  Id.  
These lower district courts applied a simple relevancy standard to proffered scientific evidence.  
Id.  See also Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
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process unreliable for its own purposes, then the procedure must be considered 
less reliable for courtroom use.”157 
The court found that its “prior allegiance” to Frye after the enactment of 
the Florida Evidence Code “manifest[ed its] intent to use the Frye test . . . even 
though the Frye test is not set forth in the evidence code.”158  The court 
grounded its decision upon a notion of reliability and implied that using a 
standard other than Frye would allow an expert to qualify his own testimony 
by his own assertions.159  This argument is a tacit condemnation of both the 
relevance standard160 and the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Daubert.  At least as far as Florida courts are concerned, Frye is currently the 
only method by which the reliability of expert testimony can be assured.161 
3. Adherence to Frye: Is a Conservative Approach Appropriate for 
Scientific Evidence? 
Florida and California have been steadfast in their support of Frye, though 
both states have evidence codes with rules similar to Rule 702.  Where the 
Supreme Court found Frye and “general acceptance” to be incompatible with 
the federal rules, Florida and California found compatibility with their 
evidence codes.  The reasons for these fundamentally dissimilar interpretations 
of relatively similar statutory provisions cannot be attributed to vagaries in 
statutory interpretation.  The courts in Florida and California have decided to 
keep Frye as the standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence and have 
interpreted their code provisions accordingly.  This is not to say, however, that 
Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire reflect a natural or inevitable reading of Rule 
702.  It is safe to say that the majority in Daubert, at least to some extent, 
tailored their reading of Rule 702 to reach their desired ends as well. 
The primary motivation for this continued adherence to Frye seems to be a 
belief in the absolute need for a conservative test.  The Supreme Courts of both 
California and Florida have repeatedly lauded Frye’s conservative nature.  It is 
this conservatism, this need to leave the determination of reliability solely in 
the hands of the scientists that is the hallmark of the qualification issue in these 
states.  Implicit in this stance is the notion that judges and juries should not 
 
 157. Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 577–78 (quoting State v. Stokes, 548 So. 2d 188, 193–94 (Fla. 
1989)). 
 158. Id. at 578. 
 159. Id. (arguing that to use anything other than Frye “would permit resolutions based upon 
evidence which has not been demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable and would thereby cast 
doubt on the reliability of the factual resolutions”). 
 160. For an explanation of this standard, see Giannelli, supra note 53, at 1205. 
 161. See Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993).  Florida courts have consciously 
chosen to restrict Frye’s “rigid” qualification regimen to novel scientific evidence.  Id.  
Accordingly, all other kinds of expert testimony are not subject to the strictures that often 
accompany application of Frye.  Id. 
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undertake the reliability determination.  It does not necessarily follow that the 
law in these states reflects the notion that judges and juries are incapable of 
coherently determining the reliability of a scientific methodology or principle, 
but rather, it is fairly implied.  This implication produces the fundamental and 
determinative question: Are judges and juries capable of ascertaining the 
reliability of a scientific methodology or principle?  If they are, then Frye and 
its “general acceptance” test are anachronistic and should be extricated from 
the books in every state that continues to apply Frye.  If a judge is capable of 
coming to a determination that testimony based on novel science is both 
relevant and reliable and not unduly prejudicial, then this determination should 
be respected without regard to whether the science is generally accepted.  
Conversely, if a judge and jury are incapable of producing coherent 
determinations on the reliability of a scientific methodology or principle, then 
Frye and general acceptance are the pragmatic solution to a complicated 
problem.  Although the “general acceptance” test is admittedly conservative 
and would exclude some reliable and relevant evidence, this would be an 
acceptable loss when compared to the alternative—inconsistent and 
contradictory admissibility determinations resulting in the admission of 
evidence based on shoddy science or the needless restriction of reliable and 
relevant evidence. 
C. States That Have Adopted the Daubert Formulation 
1. Iowa 
Iowa has an evidence code modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
and as such, has adopted a rule equivalent to Rule 702.162  As early as 1981, 
the Supreme Court of Iowa held that Frye was not a prerequisite to the 
admission of scientific evidence and that Frye need not be applied if reliability 
could be ascertained in another manner.163  In Hall, the court found Frye 
incompatible with evidence law as promulgated in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and incompatible with the liberal trend in evidence law in Iowa.164 
In 1994, the court decided Hutchison v. American Family Mutual 
Insurance Co.165  The court refused to apply restrictions on expert testimony 
that were not found in Iowa Rule of Evidence 702, or in Daubert.166  
 
 162. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 5.702 (West 2004).  Commenting on the nature of this rule, the 
Supreme Court of Iowa noted that the adoption of this rule was in accordance with the liberal 
stance that Iowa courts had taken regarding opinion testimony.  Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 1994). 
 163. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980). 
 164. Id. 
 165. 514 N.W.2d at 882. 
 166. Id. at 887.  Specifically, the court refused to interpret Rule 702 as requiring that a 
potential expert “belong[] to a particular profession or ha[ve] a particular degree.”  Id. at 887–88. 
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Furthermore, the Iowa court found the Supreme Court’s stance in Daubert—in 
favor of a discretionary role for the trial judge in determining admissibility—to 
be more effective than the more fixed and confined position of a judge 
operating under the framework of Frye.167 
Following the lead of the majority in Daubert, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
expressed its belief that judges in Iowa were capable of exercising their 
discretion in the adjudication of these matters.168  The court’s previous official 
displeasure with Frye and liberal construction of its own evidence law made 
Iowa a natural for the adoption of the Daubert standard; the state took less than 
a year to recognize the Daubert test as the appropriate standard to govern in 
Iowa. 
2. Texas 
Like Iowa, Texas has adopted a Daubert-like standard governing the 
admissibility of scientific evidence.  In E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, 
Inc. v. Robinson, the Supreme Court of Texas found that in order for an 
expert’s testimony to be admitted, it must be relevant to an issue in the case 
and it must be based on a reliable foundation.169  The court referenced a 
problem thought to be pervasive in the realm of expert testimony; namely, that 
a party can usually find an expert to deliver an opinion in support of its theory 
of the case “regardless of its merit.”170 
Relying on Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure and an 
opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals,171 the Robinson court was 
persuaded that the Daubert test was the appropriate standard for Texas.  In 
addition to the illustrative factors in Daubert, the court found that an analysis 
of the “extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation 
of the expert,” is relevant to the trial court’s initial determination of 
admissibility.172  Although this requirement may be implicit in a thoughtful 
 
 167. Id. at 888. 
 168. Id. 
 169. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. 1995). 
 170. Id. at 553.  This proposition is troubling on many levels.  If this is the reality of the 
situation, then both experts and attorneys may be shirking their ethical responsibilities in their 
respective professions. 
 171. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).  In Robinson, the Texas 
Supreme Court adopted the nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in Kelly that should be 
considered in a determination of reliability.  The list includes: “(1) general acceptance of the 
theory and technique by the relevant scientific community; (2) the experts qualifications; (3) the 
existence of literature supporting or rejecting the theory; (4) the technique’s potential rate of 
error; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with 
which the theory or technique can be explained to the trial court; and (7) the experience and skill 
of the person who applied the technique on the occasion in question.”  Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 
556 (citation omitted). 
 172. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557. 
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analysis of other Daubert factors, this is a significant addition because it may 
alleviate some measure of a court’s incredulity regarding a well-credentialed 
expert. 
In Robinson, the court also disregarded the dissent’s claim that adopting 
Daubert would force a judge to assume the role of an amateur scientist.173  The 
court was convinced that one need not be a scientist to evaluate the reliability 
of a scientific technique and felt that judges were capable of undertaking the 
task.174  Further, the court rejected the argument that Daubert was 
unconstitutional because the judge’s function as gatekeeper usurped the jury’s 
role in determining the weight and credibility of witnesses.175  Dismissing this 
argument, the court cited the difference between the reliability of a theory and 
the credibility of a witness.176 
In Robinson, the court was cognizant of the problem of calling on the jury 
to be the arbiter of complex scientific questions that not even scientists can 
agree on.177  It also took into account the difficulty juries have in evaluating 
expert evidence, noting that “it can be both powerful and misleading.”178  In 
light of the potential for the misuse or overly influential character of expert 
scientific testimony, Texas law mandates a higher responsibility for its judges 
to “ensure that expert testimony show some indicia of reliability.”179 
3. Delaware 
Delaware is another state that has rejected the Frye test in favor of a test 
akin to Daubert.  In Nelson v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed 
the admissibility of DNA typing in criminal prosecutions.180  At trial, the 
prosecution introduced the results of a DNA test of the defendant’s blood, 
which showed that the defendant’s DNA matched the DNA taken from semen 
found on the victim.181  On appeal, the defendant claimed the results of the 
DNA tests were inadmissible under Frye because the test was “still emerging” 
and because there were several deficiencies in the test.182  Since the adoption 
of the Delaware Rules of Evidence in 1980—modeled on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence—courts in Delaware have consistently held that Frye’s “general 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 557–58.  The court went on to suggest that a judge may be more capable of 
assessing this kind of question than a jury—citing the judge’s ability to review documents and 
briefs while juries must depend on oral testimony.  Id. at 558. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 553. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. 628 A.2d 69, 70 (Del. 1993). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 72. 
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acceptance” test is not the only measure for determining the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.183  The court found that the trial court’s failure to apply 
Frye was not error.184  In making this determination, the court held that the 
admission of scientific evidence was to be governed by the relevant provisions 
of the Delaware Rules of Evidence, and as such, if evidence was to be 
admitted, the trial court must find the evidence relevant and reliable.185  With 
this framework for determining admissibility, the Nelson court held that the 
DNA typing evidence was inadmissible because the evidence should have been 
presented in conjunction with a statistical interpretation of the match.186 
Because the Delaware Rules and Federal Rules are so similar, the Supreme 
Court of Delaware follows the interpretation of Rule 702 handed down by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.187  Accordingly, Delaware’s highest court 
has adopted the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Daubert and Carmichael 
holding that the trial court’s gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert 
testimony, not just to testimony based on novel science.188 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although it has been the subject of much discussion, the question of 
whether a judge has the capacity to evaluate the reliability of a scientific 
principle or method has not been answered.  The question, therefore, is: “What 
next?”  The Supreme Court of the United States has chosen to invest trial court 
judges with the responsibility of determining the reliability of principles and 
methodologies underlying proposed scientific testimony.  This is a 
discretionary function that the Supreme Court is confident trial judges have the 
capacity to undertake.  Some states have chosen to continue to apply the Frye 
test.  These states have determined that the best way to ensure that only reliable 
evidence reaches the jury is to mandate that the methodology or principle 
underlying an expert’s testimony is generally accepted by the relevant 
scientific community.  These courts are confident that the scientists themselves 
 
 183. Id. at 73; see also Santiago v. State, 510 A.2d 488, 489 (Del. 1986); Whalen v. State, 434 
A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1981). 
 184. Nelson, 628 A.2d at 73. 
 185. Id. at 74.  The court found that the relevancy and reliability requirements were the same 
as those set forth in Daubert.  Id.  In a footnote to the opinion, the court noted that, like the 
requirements of Rule 702, the analysis under the Delaware Rules of Evidence must be focused on 
the methodologies underlying the proffered evidence and not on the resultant conclusions.  Id. at 
74 n.6. 
 186. Id. at 75.  At trial, the Superior Court excluded the State’s statistical evidence relating to 
the match of the DNA type.  Id.  The Supreme Court found this exclusion to be an error of law, 
and that for DNA matching evidence to be admissible it must be submitted in conjunction with 
this statistical interpretation.  Id.  However, because of the “overwhelming evidence” in support 
of the convictions, the court held the error to be harmless.  Id. at 70. 
 187. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 521 (Del. 1999). 
 188. Id. at 522. 
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are those best fit to pass judgment on questions of reliability.  This begs the 
question, of course, of whether a relevant community of scientists is the only 
group capable of making this determination—or if they are capable of making 
this determination at all.  Finally, there are those states that have chosen to 
leave questions of disputed reliability to juries.  These courts are confident that 
impeachment and cross-examination can adequately resolve questions of 
disputed reliability. 
Missouri, on the other hand, is a paragon of inconsistency.  The situation in 
Missouri illustrates why these issues continue to be brought before the high 
courts in the states.  The Supreme Court of Missouri has addressed this issue 
many times and has failed to produce a coherent framework to clarify how the 
determination of the admissibility of scientific evidence should be governed.  
Although one member of the court has advised that litigators should “Forget 
Frye.  Forget Daubert [and] [r]ead the statute,”189 it is clear that statutes based 
on Rule 702 are not self-executing and are inherently unclear.  The Supreme 
Court of the United States has interpreted Rule 702 to require a trial judge to 
become a gatekeeper and evaluator of scientific methodology, with the 
responsibility of determining whether that methodology represents “scientific 
knowledge.”  Conversely, various state courts have come to another conclusion 
altogether.  They have determined that “general acceptance” and the provisions 
based on Rule 702 are not incompatible.  To direct litigators to look to the face 
of the statute for clarification on this issue is laughable. 
The debate over Daubert and Frye will continue so long as a judge’s 
ability to determine the reliability of scientific principles and methodology is 
questioned.  As soon as enough courts decide that trial judges are capable of 
making this determination, Frye should be abandoned.  The trend in the states 
is in this direction.  No rationale can possibly support Frye if judges possess 
the capacity to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence.  At least insofar as 
judicial economy is concerned, “general acceptance” could still play a role as a 
mechanism for expedience.  The reliability of a methodology or technique 
recognized as generally accepted would not be unquestionable.  However, if a 
principle were considered generally accepted, perhaps a rebuttable 
presumption of reliability in favor of a generally accepted technique should be 
created.  In effect, if judges can be trusted to determine a technique’s 
reliability, then a continued adherence to Frye creates too great a risk that 
relevant and reliable evidence will be excluded from the jury. 
Although not as restrictive as Frye, Daubert still presents some problems.  
If well-credentialed experts genuinely disagree on the reliability of a 
methodology or principle, then maybe a judge should not be the one to make 
the ultimate determination on reliability.  When such genuine disputes arise, 
 
 189. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 160 (Mo. 
2003) (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the question may become more akin to a determination of weight and 
credibility and less similar to other determinations of admissibility.  Perhaps 
Wisconsin and Virginia have developed a more workable and fair approach to 
determinations of fiercely contested reliability.  These states allow the jury to 
decide which expert to believe; thus, they are not deprived of potentially 
reliable evidence.  Of course, these formulations could allow unreliable 
testimony to reach the jury, but, as always, the jury can choose to disbelieve 
this testimony, as this is one of its primary functions in the first place.  Along 
this same line, the potential for a jury to become overly influenced by the 
testimony of an expert can be mitigated in cases where each side presents 
testimony of qualified experts that is arguably reliable.  Thus, any potential 
awe that a jury might experience would be spread across the experts of both 
parties. 
In Daubert, Justice Blackmun observed that “there are important 
differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth 
in the laboratory.  Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.  
Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.”190  The 
law, however, is also subject to revision.  When the law ceases to achieve its 
purpose, a revision may be necessary.  Those states that adopted Daubert 
decided that an application of Frye was no longer consistent with their rules 
governing admissibility of scientific evidence.  Some states determined that 
Frye was appropriate, and others determined that neither Daubert nor Frye 
were appropriate.  So long as judicial capacity to evaluate the reliability of 
science is in question, determining the appropriate standard will be difficult.  
However, there are other choices available, and with time, one of the choices 
may turn out to be the most pragmatic solution to this difficult problem. 
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 190. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596–97 (1993). 
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